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NOTES
THE DEMISE OF THE SERVICE-CONNECTION
TEST: SOLORIO v. UNITED STATES
The United States Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." 1
Pursuant to this grant of authority, Congress enacted the Uniform Code of
Military Justice2 (UCMJ), creating a military court system independent of
article III federal courts and providing that system with broad jurisdiction
over military servicemembers.3 When the military subjects an individual to
court-martial, it denies that person significant procedural safeguards af-
forded to his civilian counterpart; the most important of these are indict-
ment by grand jury4 and trial by petit jury.5
The historical and practical importance of these protections to the Ameri-
can scheme of justice is well established.6 As such, the United States
Supreme Court has been wary in permitting court-martial jurisdiction with-
out giving thoughtful consideration to both the interests of the military pur-
portedly fostered through its exercise of jurisdiction7 and the rights of the
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
2. Pub. L. No. 506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (U.C.M.J.).
3. U.C.M.J., art. 2, 10 U.S.C. § 802.
4. The fifth amendment exempts "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger" from its operation. U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
5. The sixth amendment guarantees the criminally accused a speedy trial and a trial by
an impartial jury in the state and district where the offense was committed. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. The justification for constitutionally excluding the right to trial by jury in the case
of military tribunals is that the framers of the Constitution meant to limit jury trials to those
defendants subject to grand jury indictment under the fifth amendment. Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866).
6. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16-18 (1955).
7. Justice Harlan's dissent in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), provides an
excellent synopsis of the military interests involved:
The United States has a vital interest in creating and maintaining an armed force of
honest, upright, and well-disciplined persons, and in preserving the reputation, mo-
rale, and integrity of the military services. Furthermore, because its personnel must,
perforce, live and work in close proximity to one another, the military has an obliga-
tion to protect each of its members from the misconduct of fellow servicemen. The
commission of offenses against the civil order manifests qualities of attitude and char-
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individual that are abrogated when he is subjected to military law.' In an
effort to reconcile these competing interests, the United States Supreme
Court established the service-connection test in O'Callahan v. Parker.9 In
order to subject a military defendant to court-martial, the test established
that a sufficient proximity must exist between the crime committed on the
one hand and military duty and necessity on the other, thereby averting the
denial of indictment by grand jury and trial by jury to the extent that an
offender's crime lacks military significance.' ° The Court clarified the ser-
vice-connection test in Relford v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary
Barracks, " where it identified the factors that are of primary importance in
determining whether to deny the servicemember's fifth and sixth amendment
rights. 2 In 1987, however, the Supreme Court abandoned these concerns in
Solorio v. United States, 3 a decision that renders unavailable procedural
acter equally destructive of military order and safety. The soldier who acts the part
of Mr. Hyde while on leave is, at best, a precarious Dr. Jekyll when back on duty.
Id. at 281 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan further noted that "[a] soldier's misconduct
directed against civilians... brings discredit upon the service of which he is a member." Id. at
282 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8. See infra notes 36-52, 69-73, and accompanying text.
9. 395 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969) (the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over a ser-
vicemember for a nonservice-connected crime violates the fifth and sixth amendments).
10. Id. at 273-74.
11. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
12. Id. at 365. Justice Blackmun, speaking for the majority, articulated the 12 "Relford
factors," which have become the analytical determinants of the service-connection test. Id.
They are:
I. The serviceman's proper absence from the base.
2. The crime's commission away from the base.
3. Its commission at a place not under military control.
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied
zone of a foreign country.
5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority stem-
ming from the war power.
6. The absence of any connection between the defendant's military du-
ties and the crime.
7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty relat-
ing to the military.
8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can
be prosecuted.
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority.
10. The absence of any threat to a military post.
11. The absence of any violation of military property.
12. The offenses being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian
courts.
Id. (citing O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273-74 (1969)).
13. 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987).
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safeguards that are germane to notions of liberty to every American ser-
vicemember, regardless of the crime committed.
In Solorio, military officials charged the petitioner1 4 with sexually abusing
the minor daughters of fellow Coast Guardsmen in his private residence in
Juneau, Alaska, in violation of articles 134,15 128,16 and 8017 of the
UCMJ.a Solorio committed these offenses while properly absent from his
post, creating no connection between his crimes and his assigned duties. 19
The military convened a general court-martial in New York to try Solorio
for these and other similar, but unrelated, crimes.2" Solorio moved to dis-
miss the charges for the Alaska offenses, alleging that the court-martial
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the crimes lacked a service-con-
nection within the meaning of O'Callahan and Relford.21 The trial judge
granted Solorio's motion, finding the facts insufficient to meet the require-
ments of the service-connection test.22 Upon the government's appeal, the
United States Coast Guard Court of Military Review reversed and reinstated
the charges. 2' The United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed, focus-
ing on the military interests compromised by the adverse effect on military
morale that results from sex offenses against military dependents 24 and the
convenience of trying all offenses in one proceeding.
25
14. Richard Solorio was on active duty in the Coast Guard at the time he committed the
offenses. Id. at 2925.
15. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1982).
16. Id. § 928.
17. Id. § 880.
18. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2926.
19. Id. at 2939 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20. The military also charged Solorio with seven specifications alleging indecent liberties,
lascivious acts, and indecent assault in violation of U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 934, for crimes that
he committed after his unit transferred him from Juneau, Alaska, to Governors Island, New
York. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2926 n.l. Because Solorio committed these crimes on-base, their
service connection was beyond dispute and jurisdiction went unchallenged. As such, they will
not be considered further herein.
21. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2926.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Solorio, 21 M.J. 251, 256 (C.M.A. 1985).
25. Id. at 258. The United States Court of Military Appeals found the fact that the vic-
tim's parents and petitioner were of the same military command compelling to its finding of
service-connection. Id. at 255-56. Further, trying the off-base Alaskan offenses separately
from the on-base New York offenses would impede judicial economy and increase the burdens
on the military, the civilian court system, the servicemember defendant, and the victims. Id. at
258. The court also pointed to the fact that the state had a reduced interest in prosecuting
Solorio for his offenses because he and the victims had since been transferred from Alaska. Id.
at 257.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court,26
affirming the decision of the Court of Military Appeals. Rather than ad-
dressing the propriety of the lower court's application of the service-connec-
tion test to the merits, however, the Court simply overruled O'Callahan."
In short, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the historical evidence the
O'Callahan Court used to establish the intent of the framers with respect to
courts-martial was inconclusive and without merit.2" He further imparted
that the plain language of the Constitution supported the vesting in Congress
of plenary power to control court-martial jurisdiction.29 Finally, the major-
ity discussed the impotency of civilian courts in policing military concerns
and the confusion experienced by military courts in applying the service-
connection test.3°
Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Agreeing
with the decision of the Court of Military Appeals, Justice Stevens urged a
finding that petitioner's crimes were service-connected and criticized the ma-
jority for its readiness to overrule precedent.31
The dissent, delivered by Justice Marshall, 32 analyzed the same historical
evidence as did the O'Callahan Court and found that such evidence sup-
ported the limitation on court-martial jurisdiction.33 The dissent further
opined that Solorio's crimes lacked service connection and that the trial
court acted properly in denying jurisdiction.34 Justice Blackmun did not
join in the portion of the dissent that contained a vehement attack on the
majority's willingness to overturn precedent and its contemptuous disregard
for constitutionally mandated protections.35
This Note will compare procedures and protections available in civilian
courts with those used in courts-martial to articulate arguments in favor of
26. Justices White, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia joined the Chief Justice. Solorio, 107 S.
Ct. at 2925.
27. Id. at 2933.
28. Id. at 2928-31.
29. Id. at 2928.
30. Id. at 2931-32.
31. Id. at 2933 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens remarked: "While there might
be some dispute about the exact standard to be applied in deciding whether to overrule prior
decisions, I had thought that we all could agree that such drastic action is only appropriate
when essential to the disposition of a case or controversy before the Court." Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
32. Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined Justice Marshall. Id. at 2933 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
33. Id. at 2936-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 2939-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 2941 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Court's action today reflects contempt,
both for members of our armed forces and for the constitutional safeguards intended to protect
us all.").
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limiting those instances in which an accused is subjected to the military
court system. It will present the relevant historical data considered by the
Court to determine the intent of the framers and will focus on the underlying
considerations that have prevailed in this area; namely, separation of powers,
military necessity, judicial economy, and constitutional interpretation. The
Note will trace the case law on the subject of constitutionally permissible
extensions of court-martial jurisdiction and determine whether the service-
connection requirement is in harmony with prior decisions. It will then ex-
amine the soundness of the majority's opinion and that of the dissent. As to
the future impact of this decision, the Court has been very clear. Unless it
reconsiders its position, all servicemembers will, without qualification,
forego the greater constitutional protections of a civilian trial.
I. ADVANCES IN MILITARY PROCEDURE: ARE THEY ENOUGH?
Critics propound that various revisions of the UCMJ have cured the pro-
cedural deficiencies that existed when the Court decided O'Callahan and
have dissipated the causes for concern over the denial of access to civilian
courts.36 This section will examine the differences between military and ci-
vilian courts that the O'Callahan Court found compelling and will trace the
advances that apparently support this proposition.
A. Pre-O'Callahan Procedure
The O'Callahan Court primarily concerned itself with four characteristics
of courts-martial: the extent to which commanding authority influenced the
decisions of court-martial actors,37 the propriety of having military person-
nel engaged in fact finding,38 the subordination of judicial decisions to the
will of the executive department, 39 and the absence of grand jury
indictments.'
The O'Callahan Court predicated its concern about command influence
on the process for convening a court-martial. The commanding officer,
vested with the authority to initiate and direct investigations, appointed the
judicial officer to preside over the court-martial. Frequently, the officer re-
ported directly to the convening authority.4 The convening authority also
36. See Brief for Respondent at 32-40, Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987)
(No. 85-158 1). See generally Kaczynski, From O'Callahan to Chappel: The Burger Court and
the Military, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 235, 279-83 (1984).
37. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 264 (1969).
38. Id. at 262-63 (citing Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955)).
39. Id. at 264 (citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955)).
40. Id. at 262.
41. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 4g(l) (1951). The presid-
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selected counsel for both the prosecution and the defense from among his
subordinates. 2 In addition, the commanding officer selected the panel
members, who served as finders of fact and likewise reported to him. 3
Although these relationships do not invariably lead to a conclusion that the
will of the convening authority dictated the results of the proceeding, argua-
bly, factors such as direct and indirect discipline' and upward mobility
could have influenced the decisionmaking of these actors. Nevertheless, the
Court found that the interdependence of these functions posed an inappro-
priate threat of wrongful influence.4"
The O'Callahan Court also expressed concern that officers, rather than a
jury of the defendant's peers, tried the court-martial.46 While conceding
that military personnel may have a special competence for trying soldiers for
purely military infractions, the Court recognized the underlying constitu-
tional preference for laymen over specialists to determine guilt or
innocence.47
Article III of the Constitution establishes a civilian judiciary separate and
distinct from the executive and the legislature, providing its judges with life
tenure and undiminishable salaries.4" Military judges, on the other hand,
remain subject to the will of the executive department. The executive de-
partment appoints and removes military judges at will without the protec-
ing officer was required to be certified by the Judge Advocate General for this duty.. U.C.M.J.,
art. 26(b); 10 U.S.C. § 826(b) (1982).
42. U.C.M.J., art. 27(a), 10 U.S.C. § 827(a) (1982).
43. See Kaczynski, supra note 36, at 281 ("Although Article 37 of the U.C.M.J. had
forbidden commanders to take disciplinary action against court-members on account of their
service on a court-martial panel, perceptions of command influence on court-members
persisted.").
44. One commentator described direct discipline as consisting of "rules governing individ-
ual behavior, sanctions for noncompliance or rewards for compliance, and application of sanc-
tions by superiors in the hierarchy who scrutinize individual behavior." Hirschhorn, The
Separate Community.: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C.L.
REV. 177, 219 (1983). No less influential upon the servicemember's behavior is indirect, or
internalized, discipline, which "brings the individual to identify his own emotional well being
with the goals of the organization so that he will consider it in his own interest to fulfill his role
even when there is no prospect of scrutiny by superiors." Id.
45. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 264 (1969).
46. See id. at 263 n.2 (although article 25(c) of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 825(c) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986), provides that an enlisted man could request that one-third of the panel be
comprised of enlisted men, in practice only senior enlisted personnel actually serve).
47. Id. at 263 (citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955)).
"Juries fairly chosen from different walks of life bring into the jury box a variety of different
experiences, feelings, intuitions and habits. Such juries may reach completely different conclu-
sions than would be reached by specialists in any single field, including specialists in the mili-
tary field." Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955).
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Toth, 350 U.S. at 16.
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tion of article III's impeachment requirements or its salary provisions.49
The possibility, if not the inevitability, of coercion exerted by congressional
and executive delegates is undeniable.
The Constitution also provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury." 5 Although critics argue that the absence of indict-
ment by grand jury in courts-martial is a de minimis loss of protection,5 the
O'Callahan Court still found the right significant to the extent that the fram-
ers had included it in the Constitution.5" Therefore, the Court believed it
should not lightly abrogate that right.
B. Recent Developments in the Military Justice System
The Military Justice Act of 1968"3 became effective shortly after the
O'Callahan decision54 and was the first major revision of military court-mar-
tial practice and procedure since the enactment of the UCMJ.55 The Act
attempts to cure many of the previously mentioned defects in the military's
criminal justice system, with a special emphasis on ameliorating command
influences.
56
The Act establishes a judiciary that purportedly operates independent of
local commanding authority. It provides that the military judge,
49. Toth, 350 U.S. at 17.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
51. See, e.g., Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker: Milestone or Millstone in Military Justice,
1969 DUKE L.J. 853, 864 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)) (indictment by
grand jury not required by fourteenth amendment due process clause); id. at 865 ("[N]either in
federal nor state courts does the grand jury procedure provide an accused with discovery of the
prosecution's case as is afforded to servicemen pursuant to Article 32 of the Uniform Code.");
id. ("[Iln many instances the grand jury is more of a sword for the Government than a shield
for the defendant."); see also Nelson & Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen
for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1, 58-59
(1969) (article 32 of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1982), gives the accused the right to a
preliminary investigation which includes examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the
right to present evidence in his own behalf, and the right to acquire testimony expected to be
used against him).
52. See Toth, 350 U.S. at 16.
53. Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
1o U.S.C.).
54. The Court decided O'Callahan on June 2, 1969. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,
258 (1969). The Act became effective on August 1, 1969. See Kaczynski, supra note 36, at
279.
55. See Kaczynski, supra note 36, at 279.
56. The Military Justice Act of 1968 also sought to improve methods of pleading, rules of
evidence, and summary court-martial procedures. See Kaczynski, supra note 36, at 281-91.
These revisions are not as vital to the purpose of this Note as are those affecting the province of
the military judge, panel members, and defense counsel, and are therefore beyond its scope.
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subordinate only to the Judge Advocate General, not report to the conven-
ing authority.17 Further, it expressly prohibits the convening authority from
preparing or reviewing a report concerning the judge's fitness, effectiveness,
and efficiency in performing his judicial duties.58 It also prohibited the con-
vening authority from adversely evaluating defense counsel's performance if
that evaluation is based on the zealous representation of his client.59 The
same prohibition applies to the performance reports of court-martial mem-
bers.6° Finally, the Act grants the accused the option of being tried before a
military judge alone, subject to the approval of that military judge.6
The Military Justice Act of 198362 divests the convening authority of the
power to designate the military judge in a court-martial63 and requires each
service to prescribe the method for appointment of defense counsel.64 The
Army, Air Force, and Navy have thus established systems of independent
defense counsel.65
Despite these efforts to eliminate the threat of command influence, many
differences between the civilian and military justice systems remain. Mili-
tary judges remain untenured and without salary protections. The Constitu-
tion designed the tenure and salary provisions to establish an independent
and detached federal judiciary, free from the threat of executive and congres-
sional coercion and free to conduct their judicial duties according to individ-
ual conscience and sound legal principles. The dangers that the framers
sought to obviate through these provisions continue to exist in the military
justice system today.66
57. Article 26(c) of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 826(c) (1982), reads in relevant part: "A
commissioned officer who is certified to be qualified for duty as a military judge of a general
court-martial may perform such duties only when he is assigned and directly responsible to the
Judge Advocate General." Id.
58. Id.
59. U.C.M.J., art. 37(b)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 837(b)(2).
60. Id. art. 37(b)(1), § 837(b)(1).
61. U.C.M.J., art. 16(l)(B), 10 U.S.C. § 816(l)(B), (2)(B) (1982). The U.C.M.J. affords
the military judge significant discretion in approving or disapproving a request for trial by
military judge alone, but such discretion is "subject to review for abuse." United States v.
Butler, 14 M.J. 72, 73 (C.M.A. 1982).
62. Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
10 U.S.C.).
63. U.C.M.J., art. 26(a), 10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
64. U.C.M.J., art. 27(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 827(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
65. See Brief for Respondent at 35-36, Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987)
(No. 85-1581) (citing Army Reg. 27-10, ch. 6 (Dec. 10, 1985); Air Force Reg. I 11-1, paras. 3-
6, 13-3 (Aug. 1, 1984); NAVY LEGAL SERVICES OFFICE MANUAL, NAVLEGSVCINST
5800.1, §§ 0100-0104, 0401(a)-(c) (Apr. 18, 1980)).
66. The government in Solorio argued that these differences were insignificant. Brief for
Respondent at 35 n.32. Because these provisions are not applicable to the states, they would
not apply to a strictly local crime. Id. (citing Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410
1152 [Vol. 37:1145
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The convening authority continues to possess a degree of control un-
matched among his civilian counterparts. He has sole discretion to deter-
mine who serves as members of the court-martial.67 Further, he can
circumvent the investigating officer's recommendation in a pretrial investiga-
tion and refer charges to court-martial if, in his opinion, the evidence war-
rants the charge.68
Finally, and arguably most important, the military defendant has no right
to indictment by grand jury or trial by jury. As already discussed, the pre-
liminary investigation provided by article 32 of the UCMJ has imitated the
grand jury indictment to a limited extent.69 The court-martial members,
however, do not bear a sufficiently convincing resemblance to civilian jury
members to equate them with civilians as impartial finders of fact. After
selection by the convening authority, they serve subject to the accused's ex-
ercise of only one peremptory challenge.70 Because the number of court-
martial members need not exceed five,7 the convening authority retains
largely unchecked discretion, which is especially significant given the fact
that the UCMJ requires only a two-thirds vote to convict.72 Moreover, the
military system's failure to secure a representative cross-section on the panel
through civilian jury selection procedures offends traditional notions of
justice.73
II. INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
Much of the controversy over the constitutional limitations of court-mar-
tial jurisdiction stems from the seemingly unidentifiable intent of the fram-
(1973)). The government asserted that trial by an untenured judge would deprive neither a
federal defendant, nor a state defendant, of due process of law. Id. (citing Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973)).
67. Article 25(d)(2) of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1982), provides in relevant
part: "[T]he convening authority shall detail as members [of the court-martial] such members
of the armed forces as, in his opinion, are best qualified for the duty by reason of age, educa-
tion, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament." Id.
68. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 13, Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987) (No. 85-
1581) (citing art. 34, 10 U.S.C. § 834 (Supp. III 1985); RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, MAN-
UAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, rule 601(d)(l) (1984)).
69. See U.C.M.J., art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1982); supra note 51 and accompanying text.
70. U.C.M.J., art. 41(b), 10 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1982).
71. A general court-martial consists of five or more members. U.C.M.J., art. 16, 10
U.S.C. § 816(l)(a) (1982). A special court-martial consists of three or more members. Id. art.
16, § 816(2)(a).
72. Id. art. 52(a)(2), § 852(a)(2). When the death penalty is made mandatory for a spe-
cific offense, the vote must be unanimous to convict. Id. art. 52(a)(1), § 852(a)(1).
73. Contra Everett, supra note 51, at 865 (suggesting that because a serviceman is not
usually from the community in which a civil authority would try him, trial by jury may be
undesirable given the community's possible hostility to him as an outside intruder).
1988] 1153
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ers.7 4 Specifically, the disputed issue is whether the framers intended to
restrict trial by court-martial "to the least possible power adequate to the
end proposed."'75 The continuing debate focuses upon the practices in seven-
teenth and eighteenth century England and the American colonies.
The English Bill of Rights of 1689 granted to Parliament the power to
make and define the jurisdictional limits of courts-martial. 76 Due to Parlia-
ment's suspicious view of the military, it narrowly confined court-martial
jurisdiction to such service-related crimes as desertion, sedition, and mu-
tiny.7" Section X, article I of the American Articles of War, based on sec-
tion XI, article I of the British Articles of War, reflected this sentiment.78 It
provided for civil jurisdiction over servicemembers who committed any capi-
tal offense or any crime against civilians and commanded the accused's supe-
rior officer to deliver such person to the civil authorities. 79 Such evidence
alone seems sufficient to create an inference of a policy to strictly limit mili-
tary jurisdiction.
There is evidence that American colonists acutely distrusted broad mili-
tary authority.8" The Declaration of Independence itself charged that
"George III had 'affected to render the Military independent of and superior
to the Civil Power' and that Americans had been deprived in many cases of
'the benefits of Trial by Jury.' "s The second amendment right of the peo-
ple to bear arms and the third amendment protection against nonconsensual
quartering of soldiers further reflect this suspicion. 2 It is also significant
that the framers felt the right to trial by jury was so essential that they in-
74. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 268-72 (1969); see also id. at 276-80 (Harlan,
J., dissenting); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23-30 (1957).
75. United States ex reL Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 1, 23 (1955) (quoting Anderson v.
Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821)).
76. 1 W. & M., ch. 2, sched. 2.
77. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 269.
78. Section X, article I of the American Articles of War of 1776 provided that:
Whenever any officer or soldier shall be accused of a capital crime, or of having used
violence, or committed any offence [sic] against the persons or property of the good
people of any of the United American States, such as is punishable by the known
laws of the land, the commanding officer and officers of every regiment, troop, or
party, to which the person or persons so accused shall belong, are hereby required,
upon application duly made by or in behalf of the party or parties injured, to use his
utmost endeavors to deliver over such accused person or persons to the civil
magistrate.
Id., reprinted in 2 W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 1494 (1896).
79. Id., reprinted in 2 W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 1494 (1896).
80. "The Founders envisioned the army as a necessary institution, but one dangerous to
liberty if not confined within its essential bounds." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1957).
81. Id. at 29 (quoting The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
82. Id. at 29 n.54.
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cluded it twice in the Constitution.83 It seems incongruous to conclude that
the framers, who placed such emphasis on trial by jury and who evinced
such contempt for unfettered military authority, intended to deny ser-
vicemembers jury trials where their crimes do not implicate military
interests.
III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CONTROVERSY
In his dissent in O'Callahan v. Parker,84 Justice Harlan contended that no
constitutional basis exists for the judicial curtailment of congressional power
to define the jurisdictional limits of courts-martial.85 This view deems ple-
nary86 Congress' power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces."87 Antithetically, the majority in United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles"8 urged that unnecessary and unreasonable
expansion of court-martial jurisdiction encroached on federal court jurisdic-
tion under article III by circumventing the federal judiciary's power over
cases and controversies between the people and the federal government.89
These views comprise the extreme positions in the separation of powers con-
troversy. What lies between are countervailing considerations of congres-
sional expertise, individual rights, executive capability, military necessity,
and accepted methods of constitutional interpretation.
Historically, federal courts have exercised considerable restraint in review-
ing congressional legislation and executive implementation in the area of
courts-martial. 90 The Court has resorted to intervention only when it has
83. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955). The Constitution
provides that "[tirial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." U.S.
CONST., art. III, § 2. The sixth amendment charges that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST.,
amend. VI.
84. 395 U.S. 258, 281 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1952) defines plenary as
"unqualified" and "absolute." Id. at 1889.
87. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Congressional power in this area also derives from a
number of other clauses of article I, § 8. Clause 1 grants to Congress the power to "provide for
the common Defense." Id. cl. 1. Clause 9 gives Congress the power "to constitute Tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court." Id. cl. 9. Clause 10 empowers the Congress to "define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of
Nations." Id. cl. 10. Clause 1I gives Congress the power to "declare War." Id. cl. 11. Clause
12 gives Congress the power "to raise and support Armies." Id. cl. 12. Clause 13 gives Con-
gress the power "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy." Id. cl. 13. J. HORBALY, COURT MAR-
TIAL JURISDICTION 142 (1986).
88. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
89. Id. at 15.
90. See Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 186 (1962)
("So far as the relationship of the military to its own personnel is concerned, the basic attitude
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found that the military constitutionally or statutorily lacked jurisdiction
over the defendant's person.9' This practice derives from the notion that
because Congress has the constitutionally mandated power to make rules for
the military, it has the primary responsibility for reconciling the needs of the
military with the rights of the servicemember.92 Consistent with this view is
the proposition that Congress has considerable experience and resources to
strike this balance and is therefore in the best position to do so. 9 3 Con-
versely, the courts are "ill-equipped" in this respect.
94
O'Callahan critics also urge deference by virtue of the executive's superior
ability to assess the pros and cons in determining whether to exercise juris-
diction in a particular case. 95 Beyond its "war powers," 96 executive author-
ity in this area derives from general statutory delegation by Congress, 97 with
of the court has been that the latter's jurisdiction is most limited."). Among the reasons for
the lack of judicial intervention are the lack of supervisory control by the federal judiciary over
military justice, the fact that the judiciary has not participated meaningfully in the develop-
ment of military law, and the lack of familiarity with military traditions and customs. J.
HORBALY, supra note 87, at 168-69.
91. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960) (court-martial
lacks jurisdiction over a defendant accused of committing a noncapital offense); see also Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1957) (court-martial lacks jurisdiction over military dependents for
capital offenses committed in time of peace outside of the United States); Toth, 350 U.S. at 14-
15 (court-martial lacks jurisdiction over an accused who had been discharged from the service
for five months); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322-24 (1946) (military trial of civil-
ians in Hawaii under martial law is constitutionally impermissible); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2, 122-23 (1866) (court-martial without jurisdiction to try a civilian resident of a
loyal state for treason under martial law during the Civil War).
92. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), which stated:
This Court has played no role in [military law] development; we have exerted no
supervisory power over the courts which enforce it; the rights of men in the armed
forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline
and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise
balance to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that task to
Congress.
Id. at 140.
93. See Warren, supra note 90, at 187-88.
94. "[C]ourts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular
intrusion upon military authority might have. Many of the problems of the military society
are, in a sense, alien to the problems with which the judiciary is trained to deal." Id. at 187.
95. Brief for Respondent at 41, Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987) (No. 85-
1581).
96. Military jurisdiction has been subject to less stringent limitations in time of war. See
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1956) ("[T]he extraordinary circumstances present in an area
of actual fighting have been considered sufficient to permit punishment of some civilians in that
area by military courts under military rules").
97. The Executive also possesses constitutionally granted power relative to his function in
military courts-martial. Article II, § 2 declares the President to be Commander-in-Chief, giv-
ing him authority to command the armed services and to implement the laws concerning them.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Article II, § 3 empowers the President to "[c]ommission all the
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such authority ultimately resting in the hands of a military commander. As
the commanding officer bears the ultimate responsibility for enforcing adher-
ence to military law and is most familiar with the military interests involved
in a particular case, court-martial proponents contend that judicial interven-
tion unreasonably interferes with the executive's province to further those
interests.98
The Court has also argued that Congress must exercise an express grant of
constitutional power in accordance with the express guarantees conferred by
the Bill of Rights.99 By this view, the power of Congress to orchestrate mili-
tary court-martial jurisdiction is qualified rather than plenary. Any exercise
of congressional power under article I, section 8, clause 14 necessarily im-
pinges on and restricts article III and the fifth and sixth amendments. too
The appropriateness of the exercise of this power depends upon considera-
tion of the constitutional privileges denied. This view lends credence to the
notion that judicial intervention is appropriate, if not urgent, where Con-
gress or the Executive has made rules or applied them to an area void of
military concern or, more specifically, to one not involving "the land or na-
val Forces." The Constitution, from this perspective, is an "organic scheme
of government to be dealt with as an entirety, ' ' giving different grants of
power and rights their appropriate weight in determining whether the cir-
cumstances warrant judicial intervention.
IV. COURT-MARTIAL LIMITATIONS AND THE COURT
A. Pre-O'Callahan Precedents
O'Callahan v. Parker1o2 marked the Court's first denial of court-martial
jurisdiction over a defendant who was a servicemember at the time of the
commission of the offense and at the time of the attempted exercise of juris-
diction. Although it may appear that O'Callahan clearly broke from ex-
isting precedent in this respect, an analysis of prior case law reveals a
tendency to limit jurisdiction whenever its exercise exceeded the scope neces-
Officers of the United States" and to ensure that the "Laws be faithfully executed." U.S.
CONsr. art. II, § 3; see also J. HORBALY, supra note 87, at 144-45 ("What is clear from these
provisions is that the President of the United States is in charge of, responsible for, and exer-
cises control over the military forces of the United States.").
98. In Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953), the Court stated: "[J]udges are not given
the task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up channels through which such
grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and upon the President
of the United States and his subordinates." Id. at 93-94.
99. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969).
100. Reid, 354 U.S. at 46 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 44 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
102. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
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sary to foster military interests. In this light, the result in O'Callahan com-
ports with Ex parte Milligan 103 and its progeny, where the Court found
constitutionally impermissible exercises of jurisdiction in areas involving
negligible military necessity.
Ex parte Milligan involved a civilian defendant tried and convicted by a
military commission during the late Civil War. " Because Milligan was
neither a person in the military service, a prisoner of war, nor a citizen of a
rebellious state,"0 5 the Court found that the military commission's exercise
of jurisdiction violated the fifth and sixth amendments.'0 6 Particularly com-
pelling to the Court's disposition of the case were the existence and jurisdic-
tion of the civilian courts in the state where Milligan was arrested and
charged.'0 7 Therefore, martial law could not justify military jurisdiction.
The military again asserted martial law to justify broad military jurisdic-
tion in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 8 a case involving a military tribunal's trial
and conviction of two civilians in Hawaii during World War II.109 Despite
an executive proclamation of martial law in Hawaii," 0 the Court rejected
the exercise of military jurisdiction and noted the historical abhorrence of
subordinating civilian courts to military tribunals.' Although it acknowl-
edged the presence and necessity of martial law in Hawaii at that time, the
Court narrowly construed congressional intent to authorize the executive
proclamation of martial law." 2 It held that this authority did not exist
where the proper divisions between military and civilian power were of-
fended. 1 3 These divisions, the Court said, have "become part of our polit-
103. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
104. Id. at 118.
105. Milligan was a citizen of Indiana, a loyal state, and was arrested in that state by
military officials. Id.
106. Id. at 122-23.
107. Id. at 121-22. Indeed, a grand jury was convened in the district where the military
authorities arrested Milligan and failed to return an indictment on the charges against him.
Id. at 116.
108. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
109. Id. at 305-06. One petitioner, Duncan, was convicted for assaulting two Marines and
the other, White, for embezzling stock from another civilian. Id.
110. Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141, 153 (1900) (codified as
amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 1509-1512 (1982)) authorized the territorial governor to place the
territory under martial law in case of rebellion or invasion. Id. The President approved mar-
tial law in Hawaii on December 8, 1941. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 308 n.2.
111. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 324. The Court stressed that it has been loath to permit the
courts-martial to supplant civilian courts in cases not involving American occupation of enemy
territory, noting that "civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot endure together; the
antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict, one or the other must perish." Id. (quoting
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ical philosophy and institutions.""' 4 The Court went beyond Milligan in
this respect by limiting military jurisdiction despite a recognized military
emergency and a broad congressional grant of power to declare martial law.
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles' called upon the Court to deter-
mine the constitutionality of article 3(a) of the UCMJ, which authorized the
exercise of court-martial jurisdiction for certain offenses" 6 even if the ac-
cused's military status had terminated. 7 Five months after the Air Force
honorably discharged Toth, military authorities arrested him on charges of
murder committed while he served in Korea." 8 The Court held that the
exercise of military jurisdiction in this instance would involve an unaccept-
ably broad construction of Congress' power to regulate the armed forces." 
9
Toth's significance is three-fold: it recognized the inherent inferiority of mil-
itary tribunals to civilian courts;' 20 it stressed the importance of narrowly
limiting military jurisdiction;' 2 ' and, most critically, it noted that congres-
sional power in this area is not plenary but is qualified by the Bill of
Rights.' 22 The Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court held, did not justify
circumventing the greater constitutional protections of civilian trials.' 2 3
Rather, the Bill of Rights' safeguards took precedence over considerations of
congressional power and the maintenance of military discipline.'
24
Reid v. Covert 125 reiterated these principles when the Court found consti-
tutionally impermissible the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over a mil-
itary dependent charged with capital crimes.' 26 The Court similarly struck
down such jurisdiction for noncapital cases in Kinsella v. United States ex
114. Id.
115. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
116. These offenses included those which were punishable by confinement of five years or
more and those which could not be tried in the courts in the United States. Ch. 169, 64 Stat.
107, 109-10 (1950) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 803 (1982)).
117. Id.
118. Toth, 350 U.S. at 13.
119. Id. at 14-15.
120. The Court noted: "[M]ilitary tribunals have not been and probably never can be con-
stituted in such a way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution
has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts." Id. at 17.
121. Observing that "[firee countries of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to
the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops
in active service," id. at 22, the Court concluded that Congress' power is constricted to "the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed." Id. at 23 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821)).
122. Id. at 21-22.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 22-23.
125. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
126. Id. at 34-35.
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rel. Singleton. 127 These and other court-martial cases have two common
threads: the denial of jurisdiction over nonservicemember defendants and
the limitation of congressional power in this area to instances critical to mili-
tary preparedness and discipline. 2 ' O'Callahan viewed the latter principle
as controlling.
. O'Callahan, Relford, and the Service-Connection Test
The petitioner in O'Callahan was an Army sergeant who authorities ac-
cused of assaulting and attempting to rape a civilian while he was off-duty
and properly off-base. '29 The Court held that a court-martial lacked author-
ity to exercise jurisdiction over such a person under the fifth and sixth
amendments. t31 Refusing to extrapolate from the case law that status alone
determines jurisdiction, the Court concluded instead that status "is merely
the beginning of the inquiry, not its end."'' 31 The O'Callahan Court read the
"cases arising in the land or naval forces" exclusion from the fifth amend-
ment's operation to apply only when the crime committed is connected in-
trinsically to the armed forces.' 3 2 Like the Court in Toth, it refused to read
article I, section 8, clause 14 broadly so as to permit infringement of consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights.133
The dissent in O'Callahan, written by Justice Harlan, charged that the
Court's decision was wholly one-sided, giving little, if any, consideration to
the governmental interests involved. 13 4 Disagreeing with the majority's, and
consequently Toth's, contention that Congress does not have unqualified
freedom to define the limits of court-martial jurisdiction, Justice Harlan as-
serted that the plain meaning of clause 14 left that determination solely to
Congress. ' This interpretation denied the Court's province to balance
these interests. 36 Further, Justice Harlan expressed his concern with the
vagueness of the Court's decision, for it suggested "no general standard
127. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
128. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 286 (1960) (exercise of
court-martial jurisdiction over a civilian employee of the armed forces charged with a noncapi-
tal offense is unconstitutional); see also Grisham v. Hagen, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) (court-
martial cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over a civilian employee of the armed
forces charged with a capital offense).
129. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1969).
130. Id. at 272-74.
131. Id. at 267.
132. Id. at 272-73.
133. Id. at 273 ("For it is assumed that an express grant of general power to Congress is to
be exercised in harmony with express guarantees of the Bill of Rights.").
134. Id. at 274 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 275-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 281 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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for determining when the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction is
permissible." 13
The Court responded to Justice Harlan's concern over the vagueness of
the ruling and its tendency "to create confusion and proliferate litigation"
1 38
in Relford v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks.139 The
Court there articulated the factors applicable in determining service-connec-
tion in a particular case, focusing upon the place of the crime's commission,
the character of the crime, and the military duties involved. "4 Recognizing
the obvious tension between article I, section 8, clause 14 and the right to
trial by jury and presentment to grand jury,14 1 the Court carefully consid-
ered the interests involved in order to best reconcile these provisions. 142 Be-
cause the petitioner in Relford had committed his crimes upon the military
enclave,143 the Court found them service-connected and deemed military ju-
risdiction proper."'
O'Callahan and its companion cases evince a tendency on the part of the
Court to limit court-martial jurisdiction to the "least possible power ade-
quate to the end proposed."14 5 In O'Callahan, the Court first crossed the
status line to give effect to this principle, and Relford set the standard to
preserve it.1
4 6
137. Id. at 284 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan asserted: "Whatever role an ad hoc
judicial approach may have in some areas of the law, the Congress and the military are at least
entitled to know with some certainty the allowable scope of court-martial jurisdiction." Id.
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
139. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
140. See id. at 365; see also supra note 12.
141. Relford, 401 U.S. at 362-63.
142. Id. at 365, 367-69.
143. Id. at 360. The petitioner was charged with rape and abduction. Id. at 361.
144. Id. at 369.
145. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955).
146. This is not to imply that the "Relford factors" have proven entirely successful in pre-
serving the service-connection test. In Justice Harlan's dissent in O'Callahan, he warned that
"the infinite permutations of possibly relevant factors are bound to create confusion and prolif-
erate litigation over the jurisdictional issue in each instance." O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258, 284 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The confusion wrought in the area of drug offenses illustrates the problem forecasted by
Justice Harlan. In United States v. Beeker, 18 C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969), the Court
of Military Appeals held that wrongful use and possession of marijuana, either on or off base,
has such unique military significance that it is per se service-connected. Id. at 277. Seven
years later in United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26 (C.M.A. 1976), the Court of Military
Appeals disregarded Beeker and sent drug offenses back into the fact-specific, ad hoc realm of
the "Relford factors." Id. at 28. In 1980, the Court of Military Appeals again did an about-
face and found that "almost every involvement of service personnel with the commerce of
drugs is 'service-connected.' " United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 350 (C.M.A. 1980).
The abstract nature of the test, coupled with the ever-apparent quest of the court to expand
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In summary, the O'Callahan Court established the service-connection test
to give effect to the individual rights of the servicemember while preserving
Congress' power to control the military. The Court arrived at the standard
by considering the factors set forth thus far; namely, the rights to indictment
by grand jury and trial by jury, the differences between military and civilian
courts, accepted methods of constitutional interpretation and the special
needs of the military in maintaining discipline, honor, and integrity. It is
against this background that the Supreme Court's decision in Solorio v.
United States 147 must be analyzed.
V. SOLORIO V. UNITED STATES
A. Eliminating the Service-Connection Test
In Solorio v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a court-martial's
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonservice-connected crime does not violate
the fifth or sixth amendments. 148 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, based his conclusion upon three broad considerations: the "plain
meaning" of article I, section 8, clause 14; 149 the less-than-accurate histori-
cal interpretation engaged in by the Court in O'Callahan;'5 ° and the need for
judicial deference in the affairs of the military. 5'
The Court began with the proposition that the decisions prior to
its jurisdiction, has led the Court of Military Appeals to abandon the test put forth in Relford
and instead substitute per se rules. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan P. Tomes has noted this
phenomenon and asserts that the only limitation remaining is "the imagination of the prosecu-
tor." Tomes, The Imagination of the Prosecutor: The Only Limitation to Off-Post Jurisdiction
Now, Fifteen Years After O'Callahan v. Parker, 25 A.F. L. REv. 1, 33 (1985).
A few examples of the per se rules are illustrative. The "overseas exception" was formulated
by United States v. Keaton, 19 C.M.A. 64, 67-68, 41 C.M.R. 64, 67-68 (1969), where the court
reasoned that, as servicemembers overseas do not enjoy the protection of the Constitution,
court-martial jurisdiction will not infringe upon any rights to which the accused is entitled.
Tomes, supra, at 9-10. The "petty offenses exception," formulated in United States v. Sharkey,
19 C.M.A. 26, 28, 41 C.M.R. 26, 28 (1969), operates under the same principle and deems
court-martial jurisdiction proper when the crime is punishable by imprisonment of less than
six months. Tomes, supra, at 10. Crimes against other servicemembers were also deemed per
se service-connected in United States v. Rego, 19 C.M.A. 9, 9, 41 C.M.R. 9, 9 (1969). Tomes,
supra at 10-11.
One commentator has remarked: "There is no question that the Supreme Court has for all
practical purposes departed from the O'Callahan field and fenced out federal court interfer-
ence, permitting the military courts to determine those areas where court-martial jurisdiction
over offenses is appropriate and permissible." Cooper, O'Callahan Revisited: Severing the Ser-
vice Connection, 76 MIL. L. REv. 165, 185 (1977).
147. 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987).
148. Id. at 2933.
149. Id. at 2928.
150. Id. at 2928-31.
151. Id. at 2931.
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O'Callahan displayed a judicial determination that the military status of the
accused was the sole condition for the proper exercise of court-martial juris-
diction.152 In support of this proposition, the Court quoted Kinsella v.
United States ex reL Singleton, '53 which provided: "[t]he test for jurisdiction
... is one of status, namely, whether the accused in the court-martial pro-
ceeding is a person who can be regarded as falling within the term 'land and
naval Forces.' "14 The Court failed to point out that Singleton did not in-
volve a determination of the constitutionality of subjecting a servicemember
to a court-martial. Rather, that case decided that a court-martial lacked
jurisdiction over a servicemember's dependent accused of a noncapital of-
fense.155 The fact that a court-martial lacks jurisdiction because military
status is lacking does not, ipso facto, lead to a conclusion that it has jurisdic-
tion where status is present. No case before O'Callahan, nor since, has held
that status begins and ends the inquiry.
Chief Justice Rehnquist continued with an examination into the facial in-
dicia of a constitutional grant of plenary power to Congress to "make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" in article
I, section 8, clause 14.136 Noting that this grant appears in the "same sec-
tion as do the provisions granting Congress authority, inter alia, to regulate
commerce among the several States, to coin money, and to declare war,"' 57
he would not distinguish the amount of power given to Congress to control
those functions from the amount of power to control the military. He con-
cluded that Congress' power in this instance was no less plenary.' 58 Fur-
ther, he indicated that the debates over the adoption of the Constitution
provided no evidence that the framers intended to grant limited power.' 59
The dissent, written by Justice Marshall, began by attacking the majority's
focus on, and expansive reading of, article I. ' The majority, Justice Mar-
shall contended, incorrectly assumed that the O'Callahan limitation on
courts-martial involved only a construction of article 1.161 That grant of
power did not stand alone. Rather, it remained subject to the procedural
152. Id. at 2926-27.
153. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
154. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2927 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361
U.S. 234, 240-41 (1960)).
155. Kinsella 361 U.S. at 248-49.




160. Id. at 2934 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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safeguards provided in the fifth and sixth amendments.' 62 In support of this
proposition, the dissent quoted United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,,
63
which the majority had cited to support its assertion that the cases before
O'Callahan relied solely on status.IM The dissenters wrote that: "[t]he con-
stitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the armed forces ... itself
does not empower Congress to deprive people of trials under Bill of Rights
safeguards, and we are not willing to hold that power to circumvent those
safeguards should be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause."'1
65
This constitutional power, then, cannot be exercised within the sole discre-
tionary limits of Congress. Instead, to the extent that a congressional exer-
cise offends other provisions of the Constitution, it is the Court's province to
intervene.
Justice Marshall further argued that the service-connection test relied
more on a construction of the fifth amendment's exception of "cases arising
in the land and naval Forces" than on a construction of article 1.166 The
Court in O'Callahan, he contended, based its decision on the fact that a case
that involves a crime which is not service-connected is not a case "arising in"
the armed forces. 167 Therefore, the rights to presentment to a grand jury
and trial by jury must attach. Regardless of Congress' power to make rules,
it did not possess power to infringe upon these constitutional rights unless
the circumstances fulfilled the requirements of the exception.
The dissent argued that status alone did not trigger this exception.' 6 8 Had
the framers intended to except those persons in the armed forces from the
protection of the fifth and sixth amendments, they would have so pro-
vided. 169 Further, considering the primacy of these safeguards to our "con-
stitutional scheme of justice," Justice Marshall urged that their possible
infringement necessitated a strict construction of the exception.' 70 Strictly
162. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 2927.
165. Id. at 2934 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
350 U.S. 11, 21-22 (1955)).
166. Id. at 2934-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2935 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 2934 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In the dissenter's words:
Had that been the Framers' intent, it would have been easy to have said so, given that
the grand jury provision of the Amendment, which states that '[n]o Person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury,' speaks not in terms of 'crimes' or 'cases,' but of individ-
ual defendants.
Id. at 2934-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
170. Id. at 2935 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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construing the exception would lead invariably to a conclusion that a crime
that did not involve military interests, duties, rights, or property would not
constitute a case "arising in" the armed forces.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also justified overruling the O'Callahan decision
based upon his conviction that the historical data offered by the O'Callahan
Court did not suffice to prove that the framers intended a limited extension
of power to Congress to regulate courts-martial.17 1 In particular, he con-
tended that the Court was "less than accurate" in its representation that the
British military could not try soldiers for civilian crimes at the time of the
American Revolution.172 In rebutting the O'Callahan Court's evidence, the
majority quoted section XIV, article XVI of the British Articles of War of
1774, which provided for punishment by a court-martial for malicious de-
struction of property and related offenses. 173 The majority, however, omit-
ted the beginning of the quote which read: "All Officers and Soldiers are to
behave themselves orderly in Quarters, and on their March."' 174 This omis-
sion lends credence to the dissent's charge that this section was designed to
prohibit dereliction of military duty rather than to adjudicate purely civilian
crimes. 7 5 Given that section X, article I of the American Articles of War of
1776 expressly provided that soldiers be brought directly to civil magistrates
upon committing a crime against the people of the United States,' 76 the ma-
jority's contention that courts-martial historically tried soldiers for civilian
crimes is less than plausible.
The majority's principal contention with respect to the historical data
available was that such data proved too inconclusive to justify restraint of
the plenary language with which the framers conferred upon Congress the
171. Id. at 2928.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2929. Section XIV, article XVI of the British Articles of War of 1774 provided:
All Officers and Soldiers are to behave themselves orderly in Quarters, and on their
March; and whoever shall commit any Waste or Spoil either in Walks or Trees,
Parks, Warrens, Fish Ponds, Houses or Gardens, Corn Fields, Enclosures or Mead-
ows, or shall maliciously destroy and Property whatsoever belonging to any of Our
Subjects, unless by order of the then Commander in Chief of Our Forces, to annoy
any Rebels or other Enemies in Arms against Us, he or they shall be found guilty of
offending herein shall (besides such Penalties as they are liable to be law) be punished
according to the Nature and Degree of the Offence [sic], by the Judgment of a Regi-
mental or General Court Martial.
British Articles of War of 1774 art. XVI, § XIV, reprinted in G. DAVIS, MILITARY LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 581, 593 (3d rev. ed. 1915).
174. British Articles of War of 1774 art. XVI, § XIV, reprinted in G. DAVIS, MILITARY
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 581, 593 (3d rev. ed. 1915); see also Soloria, 107 S. Ct. at 2929.
175. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2937 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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power to make rules for the military. 177 The dissent attacked this narrow
reading of O'Callahan with respect to its focus and accuracy. Again focus-
ing upon the "cases arising in" language of the fifth amendment, the dissent
insisted that the overwhelming historical evidence pointed to the conclusion
that the framers did not intend this language to receive a broad construc-
tion.' 7 1 Justice Marshall cited numerous eighteenth and nineteenth century
British political and legal writers who demonstrated a suspicion of overly
broad court-martial jurisdiction. 179 Considering the primacy given the Bill
of Rights and the contempt with which the framers viewed overly expansive
military authority,' ° it is reasonable to suggest that the framers did not
consider nonmilitary crimes to "arise in" the armed forces.
B. Warrantless Overruling of Precedent
The majority pointed to the administrative difficulties that had arisen
since O'Callahan as evidence that civilian courts are "ill-equipped" to vindi-
cate military interests where the rights of a servicemember are concerned. 8'
It is plausible to opine that these administrative inconveniences provided the
impetus behind the majority's decision to overrule O'Callahan and formu-
late a bright-line status test. 182 The issue that Richard Solorio petitioned the
Court to adjudicate was not whether a court-martial violated the Constitu-
tion when it tried an accused for a nonservice-connected offense, but
whether Solorio had committed one.'" 3 Indeed, Justice Stevens, concurring
in the judgment, charged that the facts justified an affirmance of the United
States Court of Military Appeals and that the court had "no business reach-
ing out to reexamine the decisions in [O'Callahan] and [Relford].'1
8 4
177. Soloria, 107 S. Ct. at 2930.
178. Id. at 2935-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2936 (Marshall, J., dissenting); S. AYDE, A TREATISE ON COURTS MARTIAL 60
(1786) (crimes other than those stipulated by the Mutiny Act or Articles of War are to be tried
by regular civilian courts); 1 C. CLODE, MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN: THEIR ADMIN-
ISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT 158 (1869) (offenses that are purely military are within the
jurisdiction of courts-martial and those that are political or civil are within the sole jurisdic-
tions of civilian tribunals); J. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEV-
ENTEENTH CENTURY 61-62 (1983 reprint) (discussing Petition of Right of 1627, where both
houses of the legislature petitioned the Crown to redress unreasonable trial of soldiers by mili-
tary commissions).
180. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
181. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2931; see also supra note 146.
182. See id. at 2931-32 ("the service-connection approach, even as elucidated in Relford,
has proved confusing and difficult for military courts to apply").
183. See generally Brief for Respondent at 10-27, Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924
(1987) (No. 85-1581); Brief for Petitioner at 13-22, Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924
(1987) (No. 85-1581).
184. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2933 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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The dissent charged that the majority opinion "shows a blatant disregard
for principles of stare decisis, and makes more dubious the presumption 'that
bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of
individuals.' "'5 Among the rationales that have been given by the Court in
support of principled adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis is the impor-
tance of preserving public faith in the judiciary. 8 6 The age-old maxim that
ours is a government of laws and not of men dictates that settled rules of law
not be the subject of individual caprice, especially from a branch of govern-
ment which operates without direct democratic accountability. Stare decisis
exists as a buffer between nonmajoritarian lawmaking and judicial caprice,
and should not be disregarded unless the prior decision is demonstrably
incorrect. 11
8 7
The Court claimed only that the historical evidence used by the
O'Callahan court was "less than accurate" ' and "far too ambiguous."' 189
It never charged that the O'Callahan evidence was wrong, nor that its own
interpretation was more plausible. Assuming, as the Court intimates, that
the historical data is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation,
Solorio represents the exact type of arbitrariness that undermines the legiti-
macy of the Court in the public perception. Arguably, if the Court demon-
strated that O'Callahan lacked any justifiable constitutional foundation, it
would have been within its province to supplant the prior rule with its own
rule which it considered more workable and more congruous with the pur-
ported "plain meaning" of article I, section 8, clause 14. "9 But, short of
such a finding, stare decisis mandates that O'Callahan continue in vitality.
The Court's reasoning for eliminating the service-connection test is uncon-
vincing. In both its historical analysis and its constitutional construction,
the Court unreasonably shifted the focus from an examination of what cases
185. Id. at 2941 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265
(1986)).
186. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). Other rationales include:
predictability, so that people can conduct their affairs with confidence, id.; judicial economy, to
alleviate the need for relitigating issues, id.; and fairness, that similarly situated individuals will
be treated equally. Note, The Power that Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the
Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L. REV. 345, 347 (1986). These values are not
particularly offended in the case of jurisdiction precedents because such precedents are not
generally relied upon by persons in conducting their affairs and, generally speaking, are not of
the type subject to challenge for relitigation and lack of uniformity in application.
187. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 128-29 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("prece-
dent should not be jettisoned when the rule of yesterday remains viable, creates no injustice,
and can reasonably be said to be no less sound than the rule sponsored by those who seek
change").
188. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2928.
189. Id. at 2930.
190. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 404-05.
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"arise in" the armed forces to one of the degree of power given Congress
under article I. As the decision in this case has neither a sound basis in law
nor in fact, it is arguable that the primary motivation for overruling
O'Callahan rested in alleviating the administrative difficulties that have
arisen in the military court system.' 9' A bright-line test is generally desira-
ble, but not if the benefits are derived at the expense of individual rights.192
The Court justifies an expansion of court-martial jurisdiction based upon
the needs of the military in promoting and maintaining discipline, integrity,
and honor. It defies logic to say that the military can realize these objectives
through exercising jurisdiction over an accused whose crimes are alien to
any military concern. This ruling should be changed, if not through recon-
sideration by the Court, then through a congressional revision of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice.193 The tenets of individual rights so dictate.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Solorio v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a military court-
martial can exercise jurisdiction over a servicemember who commits a non-
service-connected crime without violating the fifth or sixth amendments. In
so holding, the Court overruled O'Callahan v. Parker, a decision that prop-
erly recognized the unreasonableness of denying the greater constitutional
protections of a civilian trial to a servicemember whose crimes are extrane-
ous to military concerns. The Court's reasoning for effecting this change
was unpersuasive in that it failed to demonstrate any erroneous constitu-
191. See supra note 146.
192. The Court has long recognized that infringing constitutional rights by the use of
bright-line tests cannot be justified by administrative considerations. See Tashjian v. Republi-
can Party, 107 S. Ct. 544, 550-52 (1986) ("closed primary" statute violative of freedom of
association, despite the possibility of voter confusion, increased administrative costs, and
"party raiding" in allowing independents to vote in party primaries); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972) (procedure by presumption violative of the Due Process Clause where
state presumed unwed fathers to be unfit for purposes of child custody); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 542-43 (1971) (state driver's license revocation scheme presuming fault on the part of
uninsured motorists involved in accidents unconstitutional); Carrington v. Rush, 380 U.S. 89,
95-96 (1965) (blanket exclusion of servicemen from the right to vote in state elections without
inquiry into actual residency criteria unconstitutional).
193. Indeed, recent congressional revisions of the U.C.M.J. evince a concern for the rights
of servicemember defendants that may drive Congress to make service-connection a condition
precedent to the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction. See supra notes 53-66 and accompany-
ing text. Another possible remedial action would be to amend the catch-all provisions of the
U.C.M.J., such as article 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1982), which confers jurisdiction on the court-
martial for, inter alia, "[a]ll disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline
in the armed forces," to restrict such crimes to those involving only military "disorders" and
"neglects." See also U.C.M.J., art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1982) ("Any commissioned officer,
cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.").
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tional basis to the O'Callahan decision. Rather, the Court merely sup-
planted its own will, based upon an alternate reading of the historical
evidence involved and an assertion that the service-connection test an-
nounced in O'Callahan has proven unworkable.
This holding demonstrates an unprecedented extension of judicial defer-
ence to Congress and to the Executive. While recognizing the powers
granted these branches, the Court failed to give even cursory treatment to
the rights due the individual servicemember. The service-connection test
provided the rights due when the rationale for infringing rights was lacking.
Based upon the common-sense appeal of the test and its constitutional foun-
dation, it should be restored.
Michael P. Connors

